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From Politics to Nostalgia:
The Transformation of War
Memories in France during
the 1960s–1970s
Maud Anne Bracke
University of Glasgow, UK
Abstract
This article discusses changes in collective memory of World War Two in France during
the 1960s–1970s on the basis of a contextualized discussion of three films, all of which
adopt, it is argued, a self-conscious politics of memory. The films are taken as examples
of a particular relationship to World War Two that was historically possible in a given
political context. As in most of the literature, ‘the 1968 years’ are taken as a moment of
change, but it is argued here that they constituted the end rather than the start of
political challenges to collective memory of World War Two. During the 1970s repre-
sentations of World War Two in cinema as well as public discourse more generally
were increasingly historicized and disconnected from contemporary society, and thus
de-politicized.
Keywords
‘1968’, France, French cinema, memory, World War Two
Wars and Memories
Memory and remembrance of World War Two in European societies is a topic
much commented upon in academic literature and the broader public arena. In
France, most of the debate has pivoted on the arguments put forward by Henry
Rousso in Le syndrome de Vichy, published in 1987.1 Rousso has proposed a socio-
psychological understanding of the historical development of collective memory
and public remembrance of World War Two, the resistance, collaboration, the
deportation of the Jews and the Vichy regime. While highly inﬂuential, his views
have since been criticized; the present article, too, aims to contribute to a more
reﬁned understanding of the conditions and forces leading to a transformation in
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collective memory in post-war France. Like much of the literature, I see the social
and political mobilization around 1968 as a key moment of change, but I under-
stand its signiﬁcance diﬀerently. I argue that while before ‘the 1968 years’ a polit-
ical narrative of World War Two was of central importance to the main political
actors as a source of political legitimation, in the following decade collective mem-
ories of World War Two were historicized and de-politicized, despite the ‘obses-
sion’ with the War in the popular media during the 1970s, which is described by
Rousso.2 I use the Baudrillardian notion of simulacrum to illustrate how images
and discourses of World War Two became increasingly disconnected from contem-
porary politics, and I argue that they instead fuelled a relationship with the wartime
past characterized by nostalgia.
The argument is based on a reading of three inﬂuential ﬁlms: Hiroshima mon
amour (Alain Resnais, 1959), Le chagrin et la pitie´ (Marcel Ophu¨ls, 1969) and
L’aﬃche rouge (Frank Cassenti, 1974). While diﬀerent in many ways, the three
ﬁlms share the fact that they interrogated the French audience regarding speciﬁc
questions of the wartime past, and that they were deliberately intended as reﬂec-
tions on the mechanisms of remembering and forgetting. The ﬁlms were self-con-
scious of their memory politics in a way that other, more naı¨ve cinematic
representations of World War Two were not. Having been produced within a
distance of 15 years from each other, the three ﬁlms illustrate the changes with
regard to representations of the War that occurred in France during this period.
The ﬁlms are not studied as expressions of individual memory or for what they
reveal about World War Two as a historical event. Instead, each of the ﬁlms is
taken as one of a ‘plurality of possible representations’3 of the past in a given
context, and as such, as part of collective memory. By identifying the shifting
boundaries of the kinds of images and narratives of the War which were historically
(im)possible and (un)available to the producers of these ﬁlms as well as their audi-
ences, the importance of change over time, in this case between the late 1950s and
late 1970s, is assessed.
The ﬁlms are considered as part of ‘collective memory’, understood here as a
multitude of narratives of a past event which are accepted in the public domain.4
This concept is based on what Peter Burke has termed the ‘social history of remem-
bering’: representations of the past, such as the ones presented in ﬁlms, ﬁnd their
origins in the identities and self-understanding of social groups.5 A speciﬁcation is
however needed: the approach to social memory applied here is a political one. The
ﬁlms are closely connected to the political context in which they were produced,
and are read in terms of their aim to question established, powerful narratives of
World War Two and to give voice to alternative ones. I understand collective
memory as the site of power relations and socio-political conﬂict: some narratives
will be more powerful or widely diﬀused than others, and many of them will con-
tradict or exclude each other. The public articulation of these narratives is always
political and conﬂict-ridden, whether proposed by the state, an individual, or
a social or political group. Representations of the past are always aimed at creat-
ing legitimacy and at giving credibility to one’s claims to represent the relevant
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group – be it the nation and its history and destiny, or other groups such as ideo-
logical and religious ones.6
Collective memories of a particular war need to be understood in relation to
other wars which the society or nation experienced previously or simultaneously.7
I identify this phenomenon as the layering of memories: when a given society expe-
riences war, civil war or intense socio-political conﬂict, memories of past conﬂicts
will re-merge and will serve to give meaning to the present conﬂict. The notion of
‘return of the repressed’, taken from psychoanalysis and used by Rousso and others
in relation to collective memory, is useful, but only if it is recognized that the
‘repressed’ (in this case memories of the Vichy regime and collaboration) are trans-
formed through this process. In the case of 1960s France, two developments more
than anything else provoked disruptions in hegemonic memories of World War
Two as of the late 1950s: the military intervention in Algeria (1958–1962), and the
shift from ‘high’ Cold War to East–West de´tente in which Gaullist France was a
major actor.
While important work has been done on the ways in which the Algerian war
helped transform public debate in France on World War Two, connections
between collective memories of World War Two and changes in the Cold War
are an understudied topic for France and Western Europe as a whole.8 War mem-
ories changed profoundly during the period of de´tente, and in the French context
they should be seen as both cause and eﬀect of de´tente and its domestic implica-
tions. De´tente, understood here as starting around 1962 and ending around 1979,
was characterized in France by what can be termed the erosion of the classic Cold
War identities, Gaullism and French communism. Charles de Gaulle’s formations
(the Rassemblement du peuple franc¸ais, followed by the Union pour la Re´publique
nouvelle in 1958 and the Union de democrates pour la Re´publique in 1967) on the one
hand, and the Parti communiste franc¸ais (PCF) on the other, were political and
socio-cultural identities which based their legitimacy on the vision of a Manichean
political struggle between good and evil. This struggle was understood as a battle
on both the international and the domestic level, and as the necessary continuation
of the ideological battle that was World War Two. In the 1960s these classic Cold
War identities experienced a gradual loss of support and credibility. This loss was
closely related to the rise of East–West de´tente, in that it became increasingly
diﬃcult for political leaders, whether conservative-Gaullist or communist, to pre-
sent to the public a clearly deﬁned, monolithic Cold War enemy.9 It was one factor
leading to the massive social and political protests of 1968, directed at the author-
itarianism of not only the state under President de Gaulle, but also of the PCF. The
fact that both Gaullism and communism experienced diﬃculty regaining political
legitimacy in the 1970s reﬂected the fact that World War Two had lost much of its
immediate political relevance.
The issue of periodization is central, as it teases out questions regarding the
conditions in which certain narratives of the past become hegemonic, are trans-
formed, or are deconstructed.10 Much of the literature on War memories in Europe
has interpreted 1968 as a key moment of change.11 I too take the years around
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1968 as pivotal, but understand them to be an ending rather than a beginning. The
late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the disintegration of previously hegemonic
memories of World War Two – communist and Gaullist – but this was the outcome
of a process of socio-political change rather than a starting point. Immediately
following the 1968 protests, the contours of new orthodoxies were drawn and
attempts at new consensuses made. The establishment of new orthodoxies with
regard to World War Two should be seen as an integral part of the retour a` la
normale or restoration which the country witnessed following the disruptive events
of May 1968. However, before looking into the disruptive events of the late 1960s,
the politics of remembering World War Two in early Cold War France requires
brief discussion.
Re´sistancialisme and its Undoing
All West European countries were faced in 1945 with a power vacuum and with the
absence of a political elite untainted by World War Two. Creating a new oﬃcial
memory of the resistance became a matter of reconstructing national identity and
unity; memory of the resistance thus helped in reconstructing the ‘legitimacy of the
majority’,12 in a sometimes complete absence of such legitimacy. While West
European governments came to align themselves with ‘Atlanticism’ in its political,
military, economic and cultural aspects,13 oﬃcial discourses of World War Two
and the resistance were attuned to the new dominant political cleavage, namely,
pro-Western, market-based liberal democracy versus Soviet-style communism. This
stance led to the denial or at least downplaying of the role in the resistance played
by the radical left and the Soviet-aligned communist parties. In turn, the latter
proposed their own reading of World War Two history, through which they
mythologized their own role in the anti-Fascist resistance. This required a
number of historic falsiﬁcations; in the case of France, these included the silencing
of the PCF’s position in 1939–1941 when it followed Moscow’s line of alliance with
Nazi Germany,14 and the negation of de Gaulle’s contribution to the resistance.
France’s speciﬁcity in the West European context needs to be noted. In Italy,
despite the ﬁerce Cold War battles developing in the aftermath of the War, a
number of themes were common to the accounts developed by the most political
actors on the left, centre and the right: speciﬁcally the tendency to see Fascism as a
digression, located, in a sense, outside the history of the Italian nation, and a
phenomenon which had found only limited support among the Italian people.15
The dominant political actors – from the Christian Democrats to the leaders of the
Partito comunista italiano (PCI) – proposed a historical narrative according to
which 1945 was a moment of positive break and renewal. In the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) too, the 1950s oﬃcial narrative of World War Two
was one that emphasized historical discontinuity. Historical continuities, for exam-
ple with regard to the elites, were taboo.16 The non-engagement with some of the
most pressing historical questions raised by Nazism and the Holocaust was possible
in the context of a national culture based on the belief that the Nazi defeat of 1945
4 European History Quarterly 0(0)
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constituted the most profound break, and that after it, the Federal Republic of
Germany was new and cleansed.17
In France, the dominant post-war narratives played a diﬀerent role, highlighting
the essential continuity of the French nation and its history. The Vichy regime was
presented in such a way to ﬁt in with a longer-term view of the heroism and
righteousness of the French nation. Following the exit from government of the
PCF ministers in 1947 and the start of the global and internal Cold War, political
elites in France displayed the ﬁrst signs of what Rousso has termed neo-Vichyisme,
a political project aimed at rehabilitating Marshal Philippe Pe´tain and the author-
itarian Vichy regime. The Vichy regime was understood here as having resisted the
German occupation as much as it possibly could. This understanding went hand in
hand with the ending of the brief era of punishment of former collaborators and
Vichy oﬃcials. The majority of cases of violence and legal punishment against (real
or assumed) collaborators occurred before 1945, and oﬃcial punishment of former
collaborators largely came to an end in 1951, with a law that granted them partial
amnesty. This shift was epitomized by Pe´tain’s publication of La guerre franco-
franc¸aise in 1950, in which he denounced not violence between collaborators and
resistance during the War, but the repression against former collaborators.
Unsurprisingly, blame was placed in this account solely on the PCF.18
That de Gaulle related to neo-Vichyisme in an ambivalent way was evident when
he became President of the Fifth Republic in 1958. De Gaulle used his narrative of
World War Two, the resistance and his role in it, as a central source of political
legitimation. His self-representation as the incarnation of not only the actual his-
torical resistance, but on a more abstract level of the notions of republican citi-
zenship, resistance to foreign interference and eternal ‘Frenchness’, were central to
his power. However, unwilling to alienate the post-collaborationist elites, de Gaulle
proposed a political project which Rousso has termed re´sistancialisme: the notion
of resistance was placed at the centre of France’s national identity but disconnected
from the actual historical phenomenon that was the resistance during World War
Two. The meaning of resistance was thereby expanded to absurd lengths to include
the Vichy regime; it was rendered abstract and disconnected from any notion of
violence or conﬂict among Frenchmen and women.19
Also, to the PCF, resistance became an abstract notion, to some degree
de-contextualized and made impersonal. PCF discourses of the resistance centred
on the ideological notion of anti-Fascism, and on the contribution made by the
(anonymous) working classes and (abstract) people, rather than on choices made
by individuals in complex circumstances. The PCF had its own variant on the
Gaullist myth of national unity, namely, the notion of peuple franc¸ais, built on a
double meaning: people as class and people as nation.20 As in the case of Gaullism,
the party hereby claimed to represent the nation as a whole. The PCF attempted to
achieve exclusivity in its appropriation of the resistance, by deﬁning de Gaulle as
Fascist, or ‘paving the way to Fascism’.21 Following 1958 it became an unsuccess-
ful strategy, and the party’s 1960s discourses on the War, collaboration and resis-
tance, were more than ever repetitive and sterile.22
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It would be mistaken, however, simply to understand the 1950s and early 1960s
as a period during which these two monolithic sets of war memories remained
unchanged, as important challenges to these hegemonic memories occurred in
those years.23 The breakdown of these hegemonic narratives was caused in a ﬁrst
instance by the war in Algeria (1954–1962) and the political conﬂict created by it in
France. At the outbreak of the Algerian War, de Gaulle and the conservative elites
were forced to reinforce the myth of re´sistancialisme, turning it into a something
that resembled a caricature. The Algerian War interfered with established narra-
tives of World War Two on a number of levels, on the left as well as the right,
creating new cleavages and political identities.24 The links between the two wars
consisted, ﬁrstly, in the fact that both wars provoked debates on the nature of the
nation as either a territorial/ethnical entity or an abstract political idea. Further,
the French Empire had been invoked as a justiﬁcation for the choices made both by
the Vichy regime and by de Gaulle. Finally and crucially, the war in Algeria and
speciﬁcally the torture practices used by the French army brought up diﬃcult
questions regarding the legitimate use of political violence, and the devoir d’obe´is-
sance/devoir de re´sistance. It was when it was compared with World War Two that
the political and moral illegitimacy of the Algerian War could be questioned. The
French public, and even some army oﬃcers, implicitly equated the Algerian resis-
tance with the French maquis, and the French army in Algeria with the German
army in France.25 This is not to argue that the majority of the French public was
opposed to the war in Algeria – on the contrary, all analyses demonstrate the lack
of public support for Algerian independence up to at least around 1960. Rather, the
overall sentiment was embarrassment and the start of the deconstruction of a
number of inherited national values and discourses. Thus, following the Algerian
conﬂict, the causes and methods of the French army could not be gloriﬁed without
questioning the myths of France’s wartime past.
The questioning of inherited narratives of World War Two in this context can be
read from a number of highly inﬂuential ﬁlms. In productions such as Hiroshima
mon amour (1959, screenplay by Marguerite Duras), director Alain Resnais eﬀec-
tively undermined re´sistancialisme. This is so not only because he dealt with the
themes of remembering and war, but, crucially, because he related World War Two
to his own times, and speciﬁcally to the nuclear threat. In Hiroshima, World War
Two was not historicized; instead, it lived on in the present, and Resnais transmit-
ted this message in a number of ways. It was the immediacy of the War in
Hiroshima which turned the ﬁlm into a powerful political challenge to oﬃcialized
memories of World War Two.
To better understand Resnais’ memory politics in Hiroshima, it is necessary ﬁrst
to look brieﬂy at a number of his other ﬁlms dealing with the Algerian War. In
these too, Resnais powerfully undermined dominant narratives of World War Two,
by closely relating it to the Algerian War and thus placing it in the immediacy of
French contemporary society and politics. Les Statues meurent aussi (1953) dealt
with the appropriation and therefore destruction of African art by French colo-
nizers. Although Resnais denied there was an anti-colonial or anti-racist message in
6 European History Quarterly 0(0)
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the ﬁlm, in 1968, when the French public was ﬁrst able to see the formerly banned
ﬁlm, it came be understood in this way.26 Also his next documentary ﬁlm, Nuit
et brouillard (1955), dealing with the deportation of Jews from France, receives its
full meaning when understood as a ﬁlm not only about the Holocaust but also about
France during the Algerian war. To the contemporary audience, the harsh treatment
and assembling of Jews by the German occupiers and by the French army auto-
matically yet unspeakably evoked images of the persecutions of Algerians by the
French army, both in Algeria and in France itself. In 1963 Resnais made a ﬁlm
dealing explicitly with the Algerian war:Muriel ou` le temps d’un retour. The ﬁlm has
recently been interpreted as less politically courageous than it might seem at ﬁrst
sight: while the suggestion of torture of Muriel by the main character, Bernard, is
omnipresent in the ﬁlm, actual evidence or images of torture are missing from it.
This absence, it is argued, suggest Resnais’ own reluctance to be explicit about
torture practices in Algeria, and more generally his implicit acceptance of de
Gaulle’s policies.27 My interpretation is that, ﬁrst, the ﬁlm needs to be read in a
context in which censorship remained an adamant fact, and one of which Resnais
had been victim on a number of occasions.28 Secondly, it needs to be related to his
oeuvre more generally: what all ﬁlms mentioned here investigated were the mecha-
nisms of denial and the impossibility of forgetting. Resnais displayed the politics of
taboo, ambiguity and deception of characters such as Bernard not in order to make
these acceptable, but as a denunciation of contemporary French society. In doing
so, he revealed the extent to which memory was a matter of manipulation.
On the most basic level, Hiroshima tells the story of an unnamed French woman
in her mid-30s (‘Elle’) on a visit in Hiroshima to play a role in a ﬁlm about peace,
and her love aﬀair with a Japanese man of about the same age (‘Lui’). Although
complex and ambiguous in its treatment of the themes of innocence and guilt,
trauma and memory, the ﬁlm carries two rather straightforward political messages:
ﬁrstly, its rampant attacks on the collective denial of the wartime past in France,
and secondly, its denunciation of mass murder and destruction through nuclear
weapons. While in Europe, the US and Japan many were scandalized by the ﬁlm, it
was at the same time hugely inﬂuential, to the point where for an entire generation
in France and Europe its images of Hiroshima became constitutive of the imagery
of the city, the country and the eﬀects of nuclear war.
InHiroshima, past and present blend into each other, as did wartime Nevers (the
provincial town in the Loire where Elle grew up) and devastated Hiroshima.
Eventually, the distinction between Lui and Elle’s wartime lover, a German soldier
shot at the end of the War, also vanishes. Resnais herewith aimed at two things:
ﬁrstly, to relate France’s role and experience in the War to Hiroshima’s suﬀering,
and secondly to locate the past in the present. The ﬁrst was achieved in a number of
ways. For example, the opening scenes of the ﬁlm, shots of the extreme suﬀering
and devastation provoked by the dropping of the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima,
explicitly evokes images of the concentration camps. By displaying the destruction
inﬂicted upon the people of Hiroshima, Resnais raised a question unspeakable in
the Cold War context, namely, how far the use of nuclear warfare by the USA to
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defeat its opponents had been justiﬁed. Renais problematized the dropping of the
bomb both as the method to end the War and as the fatal beginning of the nuclear
age (as Elle says during the opening scenes, ‘la stupeur qu’on y avait ose´, la stupeur
qu’on y avait re´ussi’). The USA and its allies are denounced here for their use of the
nuclear bomb, reﬂecting the end of the ﬁrst Cold War and the dismantling of the
Manichean worldview. This denunciation is framed in a more universal political
reﬂection. As Elle puts it, to a background of images of deformed children in post-
nuclear Hiroshima: ‘l’inegalite´ pose´e en principe par certaines peuples contre
d’autres peoples, par certaines races contre d’autres races, par certaines classes
contre d’autres classes’, and ‘. . . c¸a recommenc¸era . . .’.29
This method was one way in which Resnais forced France to reﬂect upon its
national myths of innocence and righteousness in World War Two. He challenged
these myths further by questioning notions of guilt and victimhood in relation to
collaboration and post-war repression. Elle painfully tells her Japanese lover the
story of her punishment – the shaving of her head, her ‘insanity’ and conﬁnement –
for having had a love aﬀair with a German soldier. She is presented as a victim, and
the act of vengeance against her is thus at least questionable. It is emphasized that
she, her environment and the town where these events take place are in no way
unusual but, to the contrary, ordinary, normal (as Elle puts it, ‘Nevers, tu vois,
c’est la ville du monde’). The story can therefore have taken place anywhere in
France, involving any French woman, any community. Elle represents France
itself: the seduction of sections of the French population by Germany and
Nazism, and the forgetting and denial of this seduction after the War. The ﬁlm
turned the French myth of victimhood on its head, stained oﬃcialized memories of
the resistance, and more generally denounced a provincial-bourgeois culture based
on hypocrisy.
The ﬁlm is above all an investigation into the mechanisms of forgetting and
remembering. Central to Elle’s painstaking soul-searching is the fact that she could
neither remember nor forget, while desiring to do both. As she says early on in the
ﬁlm, ‘Nevers, c’est la chose du monde a` laquelle je reˆve le plus, et c’est la chose du
monde a` laquelle je pense le moins’. Lui and Elle reﬂected in dialogue: ‘Comme toi,
moi aussi j’ai essaye´ de lutter avec toutes mes forces contre l’oubli. Comme toi j’ai
oublie´ . . .’. Yet the past is impossible to shed, as revealed by Elle when she says
‘regarde comme je t’oublie, regarde comme je t’ai oublie´’, while her Japanese lover
and the memory of the German soldier blend into each other. The immediacy of
the past in the present is also suggested through the fact that Elle tells her wartime
story in the present tense and addresses Lui as if he were her German lover.
Moreover, in many of the images of her conﬁnement in Nevers, Elle is the
middle-aged women she is in Hiroshima and not a 20-year old girl. Elle is her
past, as France is. Lui puts it thus: ‘C’est la [Nevers] ou il me semble avoir compris
tu as du commencer eˆtre qui tu es encore aujourd’hui’. If neither forgetting nor
remembering are fully possible – and indeed the characters in the ﬁlm seem eter-
nally suspended between these two states of being – it is because neither are free of
guilt. Like Elle, France as a nation is guilty, for its complicity in the nuclear ending
8 European History Quarterly 0(0)
XML Template (2010) [20.10.2010–6:34pm] [1–20]
{sage}EHQ/EHQ 386423.3d (EHQ) [INVALID Stage]
of the War and above all for the violence that occurred among Frenchmen and
women. If after Hiroshima, it became impossible for French society to continue
wearing the mantle of innocence, this was so because Resnais situated the past in
the present.
May ’68
By the 1960s, both hegemonic narratives of the resistance had ceased to capture the
imagination of the younger generations. After 1962, de Gaulle aimed to reinvigo-
rate the resistance myth and distance it from any malaise regarding Algeria. The
1964 anniversary of the liberation of Paris and the ceremony surrounding the
transfer of the ashes of resistance hero Jean Moulin to the Pantheon, can be
seen as Gaullism’s ﬁnal, and failed, attempt to rally the nation around a myth of
France e´ternelle of which his person was the embodiment. The attempts at now full
appropriation by the state, in a highly explicit and oﬃcialized way, of the resistance
myth, went together with the de-politicization of narratives and memories of World
War Two, as the state aimed at silencing political confrontation on the issue.30 And
the ambivalence of re´sistancialisme vis-a`-vis Vichy was more evident than ever, as
in 1965–1966 de Gaulle proceeded to grant pardons to Jacques Vasseur and Klaus
Barbie, both leading ﬁgures of the Gestapo in France.
In May 1968, in the context of a broad questioning of political legitimacy, both
the PCF and Gaullism were attacked by a generation of young radicals as well as
by the new left for their blunt political instrumentalization of the memory of the
resistance. The young protesters, new left intellectuals and far-left gauchistes used
wartime narratives and symbols to equate the Gaullist regime with Fascism and
Nazism (‘CRS=SS’), thereby going well beyond a critique of the regime’s appro-
priation of the resistance. Related to this was the desire to break the taboos sur-
rounding collaboration, the Vichy regime and, though only to some extent, the
Holocaust.31 It was intrinsically related to generational conﬂict and a categorical
diﬃdence of authority, as expressed through slogans such as ‘don’t trust anyone
over 30’. However, challenges to inherited memories of the War by the 1968 gen-
eration were limited in two respects. They were limited, ﬁrst, by the fact that rather
than scrutinizing the history of World War Two and its impact on French society,
the young radicals employed images and discourses that evoked collaboration,
Fascism and the resistance as revolutionary symbols rather than complex historical
problems. The young radicals invested the resistance myth with an alternative
historical interpretation, and this new resistance myth was now used against
those who had ﬁrst created it. According to gauchiste orthodoxy, European history
in the twentieth century was characterized by the growing contradictions of capi-
talism, leading to the excesses of Fascism, and following the latter’s defeat, result-
ing in class collaboration by parties of the centre-left in the West and the
establishment of state capitalism by communist parties in the East. However, the
attention of the young protesters and the intellectuals of the new left was not
focused on historical investigation or debate; rather, they used the themes of
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Fascism and resistance as broad, largely unspeciﬁed themes to undermine the
political legitimacy of both Gaullism and communism. The speciﬁcities of
French history during the War remained often under-discussed; while, for instance,
slogans in which the ‘SS’ featured were ubiquitous, the historical detail of the Vichy
regime or the deportation of Jews from France were hardly commented upon.
Secondly, the ’68-ers’ attack on established War memories was limited in the
sense that it did not call into question views about the essential continuity and
‘eternity’ of the French nation; quite on the contrary, the notion of French modern
history as a long revolutionary cycle was explicitly adhered to. The view on
national continuity was re-articulated into a narrative of the resistance as the
start of the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, radical at the grassroots but
nipped in the bud by the post-war elites, including communist leaderships. Yet
despite these limitations, narratives of the resistance were used in a way fundamen-
tally diﬀerent than those of the communists and Gaullists: no longer was the resis-
tance a source of political legitimacy within the framework of parliamentary
competition, it was a revolutionary dream, outside of everyday politics. This
shift historicized the resistance and World War Two in an entirely new way, proj-
ecting it into a mythical and distant past where 1789 and 1871 were also located.
In particular, a comparison with the situation in West Germany can illustrate
the fact that the French students’ challenges to oﬃcialized memories remained
contained within a series of myths of national purpose and the French revolution-
ary tradition. In West Germany, the young radicals undermined their parents’
views of Fascism and Nazism as situated outside the national historical continuum
and about 1945 as a fundamental national renewal. Young people were most
relentless in denouncing the grave historical responsibilities of their parents’ gen-
eration, and it is here that ‘1968’ was most clearly a generational conﬂict. The
students’ exposure of the failed de-Naziﬁcation was culturally and politically pre-
pared by a shift in public attitudes as of the late 1950s, referred to as the
Verhangenheitsbewaltung. Against the background of the Auschwitz trials and
other important trials, critical media and literature in the 1960s were dominated
by a popular-psychoanalytical discourse on the ‘repression’ of the wartime past in
German culture. The radical students investigated especially the implications of the
Nazi past for the political nature and socio-cultural premises of the Bonn
Republic.32 Thus, unlike the French students, German students were unable to
perpetuate any resistance myth.
Just as oﬃcial memories of World War Two had been central to the post-1945
political consensus, a new consensus in the aftermath of the dramatic social and
political crisis of 1968–1969 across (Western) Europe required the reconstruction of
hegemonic War memories. In France a degree of consensus on World War Two
was regained by the mid-1970s, and while far from receiving full support, it was
achieved more easily than in Italy and the Federal German Republic. The relative
swiftness with which new narratives of World War Two gained broad public accep-
tance by the mid-1970s can be understood as one reason for France’s relative
political stability in the decade following the turbulent events of ’68, which
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contrasts with the enduring political instability in the FRG and especially Italy.
According to Rousso, the early 1970s gave way in France to an ‘obsessive’ prolif-
eration and diversiﬁcation of memories of World War Two, which was a legacy of
the ’68 protests. In the late 1970s, he argues, the memory of World War Two was
transformed into a mode re´tro, characterized by nostalgia for the wartime period.33
But I would suggest that the start of the shift to nostalgia should be located earlier,
in the early 1970s, and be understood as an integral part of the broader political
process of post-1968 restoration. It is clear that, as discussed by Rousso, the 1970s
was a period of recurrent scandals and aﬀairs revealing the dubious wartimes pasts
of public and political ﬁgures. However, during this phase the memory of World
War Two ceased to constitute a generalized challenge to the elites in power and the
political order. When, following 1968, ‘trauma revealed itself in political, social and
cultural life’,34 it did so in conjunction with political mechanisms which sidelined
fundamental questions regarding the bases on which political legitimacy had been
rebuilt after the War.
The most revealing debates occurred following the 1969 documentary ﬁlm
Le chagrin et la pitie´ by Marcel Ophu¨ls with Andre´ Harris and Alain de Sedouy.
It was produced in 1969 but shown in cinemas only in 1971, and banned from
television until Franc¸ois Mitterrand, newly elected President, had it broadcast in
1981. Before that, the ﬁlm received international recognition in 1972 with an Oscar
for Best Documentary. The four-hour ﬁlm was at the time and has been ever since
referred to as iconoclastic: indeed, Le chagrin shattered many of France’s cherished
myths and inherited wisdoms regarding World War Two. It systematically decon-
structed re´sistancialisme, through a detailed revising of the military and political
conditions surrounding France’s defeat in 1940 and the establishment of the Vichy
regime, and by exposing the widespread support for Petain, especially among the
bourgeoisie. It was based on a case study of the town of Clermont-Ferrand, and
through interviews with former resistance members, former Vichy supporters, as
well as a number of key British and German ﬁgures including Anthony Eden and
Helmut Tausend, the SS senior oﬃcer stationed in Clermont-Ferrand. The ﬁlm
powerfully denounced the defeatism of the French population and elites in 1940s,
the popularity of Marshal Petain, the complicity of the elites in the deportation of
Jews, and the motives – at times material and banal, at times deeply ideological –
behind various forms of Fascist collaboration. One of the ﬁlm’s achievements was
that it questioned the political and cultural traits of bourgeois France, through an
investigation into the origins of Fascist authoritarianism, collaboration and anti-
Semitism.
While the ﬁrst part of the ﬁlm (‘The collapse’) reviews some of the key events
and controversies surrounding France’s defeat and the establishment of the Vichy
regime, in the second part (‘The Choice’) the themes of resistance and collaboration
are explored. Ophu¨ls set up the interviews in such a way as to highlight the key
ideological bases underpinning the various manifestations of enthusiasm for Vichy,
that is, anti-Semitism and aversion for the left. Part of his intention was to dem-
onstrate that there was a class basis behind people’s motivations, and that support
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for Petain was particularly strong among the upper middle class and bourgeoisie.
As recounted by Denis Rake, a British agent sent to France as radio operator, the
bourgeoisie was ‘very neutral’ vis-a`-vis Vichy and the Germans. Aristocrat, com-
munist sympathiser and leader of the Libe´ration resistance group, Emmanuel
d’Astier de la Vigerie, emphasizes in his testimony that the resistance was experi-
enced as ‘a classless society’. Further, the PCF’s role in the resistance is granted
much attention, through interviews with its members Jacques Duclos, former
maquis member, and Georges Bidault, president of the National Council of
Resistance Movements. While the ﬁlm thus to some degree perpetuated the resis-
tance mythology of the PCF, it did depart from it in important ways. The resis-
tance as a whole is taken down from its moral pedestal, and given a human, at
times vulnerable and un-heroic face, and the diversity of resistance members’ back-
grounds and motivations is thrown into sharp relief. Rather than ‘the working
classes’, the resistance ﬁghters in the ﬁlm are peasants, workers, aristocrats, even
criminals. What they all shared, in the words of d’Astier, was their being ‘un-
adapted to bourgeois society’. The motivations mentioned range from ideological
and patriotic ones to a fascination with adventure, or simply having ‘nothing
to lose’ (d’Astier). Highlighted also are the divisions within the resistance, and
tensions between all resistance factions and London are hinted at. The resistance
is de-sanitized: Jacques Duclos, leading ﬁgure of the PCF and former resistance
organizer, discusses it as a matter of guerrilla warfare where ‘people had to get used
to killing on a daily basis’.
As Atack has suggested, the ﬁlm, while highly eﬀective in destroying inherited
myths of World War Two, voiced the soixante-huitards’ own political myths and
agenda, notably the idea of national liberation (as connected to 1960s anti-imperi-
alism) and a less than critical portrayal of the (communist and non-communist)
left.35 I would argue that its limitations lie elsewhere too, and that the seeds of a
new consensus were present in immediate reactions to the ﬁlm and to some extent
in the ﬁlm itself. Despite the provocative and often-noted absence of de Gaulle in
the ﬁlm, the General’s claims to have represented and indeed saved the nation
during the War were in no way questioned. While it is true that the ﬁlm announced
the post-Gaullist era by not representing him directly, it did not make him irrele-
vant, quite the contrary. De Gaulle, who died in 1970, is here historicized, and his
legacy assessed in a positive light. This process takes place through the presence of
Pierre Mende`s-France, whose testimony is central to the ﬁlm’s narrative and pol-
itics. Mende`s-France is here promoted as a new national and consensual leader,
able to carry forward the General’s legacy, and, like the general, ﬁt to legitimize his
political role in wartime commitment to the resistance. Mende`s-France served in
the Free French Air Force under de Gaulle, and was appointed by him as Minister
for National Economy in the provisional government of 1944. An opponent of
colonialism, his government in 1954 opened negotiations with the Vietnamese com-
munists and the nationalist leaders of Tunisia. After the fall of his government in
the following year, he resigned as minister in the socialist-dominated government in
1956 over the military intervention in Algeria. During the 1960s he was a leading
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ﬁgure of the new left party Parti socialiste uniﬁe´, and as such he opposed, and lost
to, de Gaulle in the parliamentary elections of June 1968. Despite their intense
political opposition from 1958, Mende`s-France in Le chagrin speaks of de Gaulle in
very positive terms, stating that all of his moves during the War had been ‘polit-
ically right’.
With Mende`s-France’s testimony, Ophu¨ls not only preserved the possibility of
national leadership and national unity in the post-re´sistancialiste era, he also
restrained the ﬁlm’s anti-establishment radicalism. In his testimony Mende`s-
France narrates his trial by the Vichy regime for desertion in 1940s, his subsequent
imprisonment and escape to London. He is here presented as at once statesmanlike
and also very human. His intervention seems to have a diﬀerent status than the
ones by other statesmen in the ﬁlm, such as Anthony Eden, in the sense that
Mende`s-France is much more explicit about his aim to ‘educate youth against
propaganda’. While he emphasizes the ubiquity of treason, anti-Semitism and
petty proﬁteering among the population once the Vichy regime was established,
he also refers to an ‘other France’ made up of righteous citizens. It includes a
variety of actors, from the army oﬃcers who testiﬁed in his favour during his
trial, to the resistance and the left, including Leon Blum, and of course de
Gaulle. Thus, while the re´sistancialiste idea of a united, heroic nation in arms
against Nazism is here surrendered and replaced with an explicit acknowledgement
of the deep divisions in French society, the possibility of a charismatic national
leader able to gather broad support on the basis of his wartime record and thus
able to project a positive image of the French nation, is saved.
World War Two in the 1970s: History and Nostalgia
Responses to Le chagrin were based on a generational logic rather than on classic
ideological lines, which announced the emergence of a new, post-1968 re-composi-
tion of political identities and their sources of legitimacy. The most painful ques-
tions brought up by Le chagrin – why did the vast majority of the French in 1940
sympathize with the Vichy regime and how could the persistence of violent
anti-Semitism be explained? – were debated only by the communist and extra-
parliamentary left. As mentioned above, the French state responded to the ﬁlm
by banning it, and consecutive governments refused to have it broadcast on state
television until 1981. It was the political centre, and particularly those belonging to
the generation who had lived through the War, which tended to dislike the ﬁlm and
its contents and, with the liberal politician and former deportee Simone Veil,
accused it of replacing one set of myths with another.36 The communist and social-
ist left quickly set out, to some extent successfully, to contain the disruptive eﬀects
of Le chagrin and the questions raised by it. The PCF moulded the ﬁlm’s contents
to its political needs, which included the portrayal of resistance ﬁghters as outcasts
of bourgeois capitalist society and ordinary peasants and workers. The communists
beneﬁted from the fact that the ﬁlm quite explicitly identiﬁed the PCF with the
resistance, equating Vichyism with anti-communism, and omitting any reference to
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the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939-1941. At the same time, the party was careful not to
engage with the ﬁlm’s attempts at demystifying the resistance, its mentioning of the
sometimes less than virtuous motives behind the persecution of (alleged) collabo-
rators after the liberation, or its commentary on the at times random use of vio-
lence by the maquis.
It was chieﬂy through the acceptance of the diversity of war experiences that, to
some degree in Le chagrin itself, but more clearly in the ensuing debate, the bases of
a post-1968 consensus on World War Two were laid out. In one of the last scenes of
the ﬁlm, d’Astier recalled that he had not been shocked when de Gaulle in 1959
paid homage to Petain, because ‘this is all part of French history, whether we like it
or not’. Although Le chagrin was not ideologically agnostic and was generally
sympathetic to the left, it did attempt to present wartime France as a country of
many ideologies and many values. Through the debate provoked by the ﬁlm, an
attitude of ideological relativism became increasingly prevalent.37 The acceptance
of a diversity of experiences and recollections, and the fact that they all made up
French history and should be accepted as such, facilitated the relatively rapid
establishment of a set of new hegemonic discourses on World War Two. The
new consensus necessitated the relegation of World War Two to a distant rather
than immediate past, and included, further, a shift of attention away from it and
towards a more recent, equally consequential and divisive but far less traumatic
national event, namely May ’68 itself.38 Admittedly, as Rousso argues, the 1970s
and 1980s were characterized by a series of scandals and ‘aﬀairs’, involving poli-
ticians and other well-known public ﬁgures such as George Marchais (the PCF
leader who, it was revealed, had left voluntarily to work in Germany in 1940), and
Jean Leguay, a businessman and senior civil servant under Vichy. Yet the public
purging, through the media and public debate, of wartime collaborators was a
process through which French society cleansed itself by identifying those bearing
individual responsibility. This process was a move away from the more radical spirit
of 1968, when Jean-Paul Sartre had famously declared that ‘we are all guilty’. The
broader societal causes behind, for instance, anti-Semitism, as they were tentatively
investigated in Le chagrin, were not part of the discourses surrounding these public
purges.
The obsession with Vichy in the 1970s was not simply the ‘return of the
repressed’ as argued by Rousso and others – that is to say, the emergence of a
set of historical memories that had previously been tabooed in public debate. When
the repressed return, they do so by transformation: Vichy, the War and the resis-
tance were increasingly de-politicized and historicized, and became increasingly less
relevant to contemporary political developments. The outcome of this process can
be understood in terms of Jean Baudrillard’s notion of simulation, where the reality
of the object has been superseded by a proliferation of signs. Simulation diﬀers
from representation: while the latter implies a relation of equivalence between the
object and the sign, in the former case any connection between the two has been
lost. While through a process of representation an impact is had on the meaning of
the object, through simulation any ambition to transform the meaning of the object
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is abandoned.39 Through simulation, meaning is replaced with fascination, the
implosion of meaning, and nostalgia. Baudrillard understands simulation to be a
key mechanism of post-1968 culture and society, and relates it to the ubiquity of
visual culture. Cinema has a particular status in his analysis, as it is where history,
as a contemporary form of myth-making, ‘ﬁnds refuge’.40
Memory politics in 1970s France can be understood from this angle. Georges
Pompidou, president between 1969 and 1974, attempted to impose his own broad
silence on the War on the entire nation. During the presidency of Vale´ry Giscard
d’Estaing (1974–1981), a phenomenon Rousso has referred to as Giscardo-
vichyisme came to replace re´sistancialisme. It was a political project, supported
by the rise of the far right headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen, in which forgetting the
War became quasi-oﬃcial and dubious pasts were forgivable (as was Vale´ry
Giscard d’Estaing’s family record). Crucially, aﬃliation with the resistance no
longer served as a source of political legitimacy. Both Pompidou and Giscard
d’Estaing carried out a series of amnesties of former collaborators and
Vichyards. These were political manoeuvres aimed at undermining those ‘old’ polit-
ical identities whose legitimacy was based on the myth of the resistance, and indeed
they contributed to a restructuring of the political landscape, speciﬁcally on the
centre-right, by further weakening the old guard of Gaullists.41
The establishment of a new consensus occurred not only after debates such as
the one surrounding Ophu¨ls’ ﬁlm, but also in historiography. The Vichy myth,
according to which the installation of a collaborationist regime had been the lesser
evil, was once more abruptly challenged by the publication in 1973 of La France
de Vichy by Robert Paxton. Among Paxton’s ﬁndings was the fact that resistance in
the early years of the War had been very limited, that the establishment of the
Vichy regime had not been a German demand but was instead motivated by French
enthusiasm for Fascism, that Vichy had enjoyed widespread support up to 1944,
and that Pe´tain should be understood as a collaborator rather more straightfor-
wardly than before.
While his long-term inﬂuence on French historiography is undeniable, in the
short term Paxton’s work did not disrupt the emerging new consensus. In an obvi-
ous closing of the ranks, inspired by nationalism more than anything else,
Conservative historians and commentators simply dismissed him as a ‘young
American historian’ and failed to engage with his conclusions.42 The traditional
left, too, immediately attempted to contain the potentially disruptive eﬀects of
Paxton’s work. To some extent, Paxton helped the left in its denunciation of de
Gaulle’s oﬃcial memory of World War Two and in its attempts at rehabilitating
Pe´tain. The PCF did not, of course, follow Paxton in his de-mystiﬁcation of the
resistance and his scepticism regarding its purposes and methods, and communist
commentators systematically chose to ignore this important aspect of Paxton’s
analysis.43 The result was that PCF historians and leaders were forced into a posi-
tion where they had to admit that certain revisions of old communist myths were
more acceptable than others. The PCF in the 1970s recovered from the (post-)’68
attacks on its sterile anti-Fascism, but imperfectly so, only in the short term and
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through a silent closing of the ranks rather than through open debate. Its responses
to Paxton revealed the growing weakness of French communism in its ability to
represent the nation or to impose a narrative of French history – something it had
been able to do with some success until the mid-1950s.
What changed in the PCF’s memories of World War Two after 1968, and
because of 1968, were not the concrete contents of these memories, but a new
awareness of the party’s essential dependency on these memories and its now
overt willingness to instrumentalize them. The instrumentalization of memories
of World War Two became explicit in a wholly new way. Communist-inspired
cinema in the 1970s most clearly reﬂected this shift; it treated World War Two
in a manipulative way (which was not new) that was curiously self-conscious
(which was new). This can be seen from the most widely debated ﬁlm made in
this period that dealt with World War Two: L’aﬃche rouge by Frank Cassenti
(1974), a PCF compagnon de route. L’aﬃche rouge was, as Alison Smith argues,
an attempt to respond to concerns previously expressed by Michel Foucault and
other left-wing intellectuals regarding the possibility of, and need for, a heroic
account of the resistance after ’68. The ﬁlm self-knowingly transformed the shat-
tered post-’68 memories of the resistance once again into legend. It deals with the
‘Groupe Manouchian’, a resistance group, the myth of which was of central impor-
tance to PCF memory after 1945 but about which much historical detail remained
vague. The aim of the ﬁlm was not to represent the Groupe Manouchian in a
historically accurate way but to suggest ways in which the resistance might be
remembered in the post-’68 context. It required that World War Two became
history in a way it was not before 1968: it was now relocated, and relegated, to a
distant past. This is clear also from the opening sentence of L’aﬃche rouge:
‘N’oublie pas que tout cela s’est passe´ il y a plus que trente ans’. The key message
of the ﬁlm seems to be that it is the legend of the resistance, rather than its actual
history, that is relevant to young men and women in France. The historical inac-
curacies of which Cassenti was accused did not matter here; what mattered was the
full embracing of the legend as legend.44 Yet this shift implied the admission of the
impossibility of a universal narrative of World War Two. In the presentation of
history as shattered, subjective and fragmented, L’aﬃche was remarkably post-
modern in its intellectual implications, and visibly inﬂuenced by a soixante-huitard
legacy which the PCF always claimed to reject. But the political agenda was clear:
the PCF immunized itself against future battles over memories of World War Two
by proclaiming the victory of memory over history.
While the PCF was thus able to delay the immediate collapse of its sources of
legitimation without stopping their gradual erosion, during the 1970s the new
socialist party emerged as politically victorious from the memory battles. The
1970s saw the gradual recovery of socialism as an important political force in
France, after the disarray provoked by the May ’68 events. Key moments were:
1971, when Franc¸ois Mitterrand’s political club, the Convention of Republican
Institutions (CIR), joined the Socialist Party (PS); the signing of the Common
Programme with the PCF in 1972; Mitterrand’s narrow defeat to Giscard
16 European History Quarterly 0(0)
XML Template (2010) [20.10.2010–6:34pm] [1–20]
{sage}EHQ/EHQ 386423.3d (EHQ) [INVALID Stage]
d’Estaing in the presidential elections of 1974; the ending in 1977 of the united left
from which the PS rather than the PCF emerged as the more dynamic force; and
ﬁnally Mitterrand’s election to the presidency in 1981. One key factor making the
PS’s resurgence possible was the fact that it had been able to immunize itself
against the legacy of World War Two and, more generally, that it transformed
the French political landscape in such a way that the wartime past ceased to serve
as a legitimizing strategy. A new generation of PS leaders were either too young to
have played a role in the 1940s or had questionable wartimes records, as was the
case for Mitterrand himself, a civil servant for the Vichy regime who had joined the
resistance at the end of the War. While Mitterrand’s past was a matter of intense
media debate during the 1981 presidential election campaign, it could not prevent
him from coming to power. This was because political cleavages were no longer
based on competing interpretations of the War as they had been during the early
Cold War. But by aﬀecting the entire political spectrum, the ‘Vichy obsession’
failed to serve as a tool for de-legitimizing particular political actors. Moreover,
it was now the political exploitation or even mentioning of the War which was
considered a problem rather the actual wartime records. This problem was reﬂected
in the terms of the debate: Mitterrand was attacked by the right not for having
served in Vichy but for exaggerating and exploiting his role in the resistance.45
Mitterrand evidently had his own memory politics – denouncing once again the
collaborationist pasts of the d’Estaing family and of other conservative opponents –
but his claims to righteousness were obviously limited. In addition, his decision to
have Le chagrin broadcast on state television soon after his election, demonstrated
more than anything else that he could conﬁdently feel unaﬀected by the ﬁlm.
The debate surrounding the publication of L’ide´ologie franc¸aise by former soix-
ante-huitard Bernard-Henri Levy, again in 1981, demonstrated how World War
Two had become a political tool ﬁt for every purpose. Le´vy presented Pe´tainism as
the essence of French political culture, the legacy of which was continued, he
argued, not by the new far right or post-Gaullism, but by the PCF, tiersmondiste
currents such as the left-catholic journal L’Esprit, and what he referred to as
planisme. In this context of the second Cold War, the concept of totalitarianism
proved readily available for linking the far left to Fascism. While Rousso has
interpreted the debate surrounding L’ide´ologie franc¸aise simply as a recurring
‘symptom of nervousness’ in France regarding 1940,46 it seems to me that the
terms of the debate were radically altered with regard to the pre-1968 years. The
fact that World War Two was instrumentalized for the beneﬁt of a political
agenda – in this case, discrediting the PCF and lending support to the victory of
the socialist party – was now more explicit and self-knowing than it had been
before. This instrumentalization was explicit to the extent that Le´vy’s theses
were no longer about the wartime past, as they did not aim to engage with and
have an impact on public and collective memories of the War. Rather, they aimed
at contributing to the reconstitution of the French political landscape after 1968,
one in which memories of the War no longer constituted a line of cleavage. It was
at this stage that World War Two as a theme in literature, arts and political debate,
Bracke 17
XML Template (2010) [20.10.2010–6:34pm] [1–20]
{sage}EHQ/EHQ 386423.3d (EHQ) [INVALID Stage]
was used merely as a motif that was recognizable to all and assumed an array of
functions, but through these uses remained unaﬀected, as did its memory.
In literature such as L’ideologie francaise, or ﬁlms such as L’aﬃche rouge,World
War Two as a theme is merely a setting introduced to make a point about some-
thing else. What matters is the self-referring conversation between the ‘simulacra
which feign a relation to an obsolete real’.47 Similarly, the mode re´tro that pervaded
1970s culture and society and was characterized by a fascination for the 1940s, was
a matter of nostalgic commodiﬁcation of life during the War rather than a political
and historical engagement with the legacy of occupation, resistance and collabo-
ration.48 This was possible only because World War Two had become a faraway
past. It was now a distant country with which one could maintain a relation of
nostalgia and loss, rather than seeking ethical and political involvement and
reﬂection.
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